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Abstract 
According to causal realism, causation is a fundamental feature of the world, consisting in the 
fact that the properties that there are in the world, including notably the fundamental physical 
ones, are dispositions or powers to produce certain effects. The paper presents arguments for this 
view from the metaphysics of properties and the philosophy of physics, pointing out how this 
view leads to a coherent ontology for both physics as well as biology and the special sciences in 
general. 
1. Introduction 
Causal realism is the view that causation is a real and fundamental feature of the world. That 
is to say, causation cannot be reduced to other features of the world, such as, for instance, 
certain patterns of regularities in the distribution of the fundamental physical properties. 
Causation consists in one event bringing about or producing another event, causation being a 
relation of production or bringing something into being (see Hall 2004 for an analysis of the 
contrast between the production conception of causation and the regularity conception; the 
counterfactual analysis of causation is a sophisticated version of the regularity conception). I 
shall take events to be the relata of causal relations, without arguing for this claim in this 
paper, since this issue is not important for present purposes. More precisely, an event e1, in 
virtue of instantiating a property F, brings about another event e2, instantiating a property G. 
One can therefore characterize causal realism as the view that properties are powers. In short, 
Fs are the power to produce Gs. Saying that properties are powers means that it is essential 
for a property to exercise a certain causal role; that is what constitutes its identity. One can 
therefore characterize causal realism as the view that properties are causal in themselves. To 
abbreviate this view, I shall speak in terms of causal properties. 
To make the claim of this paper audacious, I shall defend the view that all properties that 
there are in the world are causal properties. The limiting clause “that there are in the world” is 
intended to leave open whether or not abstract mathematical objects exist: abstract 
mathematical objects, if they exist, do not cause anything, so that their properties are not 
powers. However, to the extent that properties are instantiated in the real, concrete world (by 
contrast to a – hypothetical – realm of abstract mathematical objects), it is essential for them 
to exercise a certain causal role. This is a sparse view of properties: it is not the case that for 
any predicate, there is a corresponding property in the world. 
Properties, being causal in themselves and thus powers, are dispositions – more precisely, 
dispositions that manifest themselves in bringing about certain effects. Dispositions, thus 
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conceived, are not Aristotelian potentialities, but real, actual properties. Furthermore, there is 
no question of dispositions in this sense requiring non-dispositional properties as their bases. 
If all properties are causal in themselves, being powers, then all properties are dispositions. 
The view defended in this paper hence coincides with the position known as dispositional 
monism or dispositional essentialism (see notably Bird 2007). In claiming that all properties 
are dispositions, it is not intended to deny that properties are qualities. The view is rather this 
one: in being certain qualities, properties are causal, namely powers to produce certain 
specific effects (see Esfeld and Sachse 2011, chapter 2.1, for a detailed exposition of this 
claim). Thus, for instance, in being a certain qualitative, fundamental physical property, 
charge is the power to create an electromagnetic field, manifesting itself in the attraction of 
opposite-charged and the repulsion of like-charged objects; and mass is a qualitative, 
fundamental physical property that is distinct from charge in being the power to create 
gravitational attraction (this example is meant to be a rough and ready illustration of this view 
of properties; an adequate scientific discussion would require much more details, and, 
notably, certain commitments in the interpretation of the relevant scientific theories). 
The view of causal properties is both a metaphysical and an empirical position: it is a 
stance in the metaphysics of properties, and it is a claim about what is the best interpretation 
of the ontological commitments of our scientific theories. It is opposed to the view of 
categorical properties, that is, the view according to which properties are pure qualities, 
exercising a causal role only contingently, depending on the whole distribution of the 
fundamental physical properties in a given world and / or the laws of nature holding in a 
given world. That latter view also is both a metaphysical and an empirical position. As a 
metaphysical position, it is usually traced back to Hume’s stance on causation and is today 
known as Humean metaphysics (see notably Lewis 1986, introduction, and Lewis 2009). As 
an empirical position, it can be traced back to Russell’s famous claim that causation is a 
notion that has no place in the interpretation of contemporary physics (Russell 1912). For the 
sake of simplicity, I shall confront the view of causal properties only with the Humean view 
of categorical properties, thereby leaving out in particular views that invoke a commitment to 
universals and certain relations among universals in order to account for causation and laws 
(see notably Armstrong 1983); the issue of a commitment to universals is not important for 
the arguments considered in this paper. 
Accordingly, I shall mention the metaphysical argument for causal in contrast to Humean 
categorical properties in the next section, then move on to arguments from physics (sections 3 
and 4) and finally consider the perspective for an account of the relationship between physics 
and the special sciences such as biology that this view offers (section 5). Covering all these 
issues in a short paper means that I can only sketch out the main features of the central 
arguments here, providing the reader with some sort of an overview of the case for causal 
realism (for a detailed study, see Esfeld and Sachse 2011). 
2. The metaphysical argument for causal properties 
The main metaphysical argument against the view of categorical properties is that this view is 
committed to quidditism. Accordingly, the main argument for the causal view of properties is 
that this view avoids any association with quidditism. If properties play a causal and 
nomological role only contingently, then their essence is independent of the causal relations 
in which they enter and the laws in which they figure. Their essence then is a pure quality, 
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known as quiddity (see Black 2000). It is a primitive suchness, consisting in the simple fact of 
being such and such a quality, without that quality being tied to anything, notably not tied to 
certain causal or nomological relations. Consequently, it is not possible to have a cognitive 
access to the qualitative nature of the properties; that consequence is known as humility (see 
in particular Lewis 2009). 
The commitment to quiddities is objectionable, since it obliges one to recognize worlds as 
being qualitatively different, although they are indiscernible. Quidditism about properties is 
analogous to haecceitism about individuals. A haecceitistic difference between possible 
worlds is a difference that consists only in the fact that there are different individuals in two 
worlds, without there being any qualitative difference between the worlds in question. In 
other words, a haecceitistic difference is a difference between individuals which has the 
consequence that worlds have to be recognized as different, although they are indiscernible. If 
one maintains that the essence of properties is a primitive suchness (a quiddity), a similar 
consequence ensues: one is in this case committed to recognizing worlds as different that are 
identical with respect to all causal and nomological relations, but that differ in the purely 
qualitative essence of the properties that exist in them. 
Thus, for instance, the property that exercises the charge role in the actual world can 
exercise the mass role in another possible world, since the qualitative nature of that property 
is on this conception not tied to any role that tokens of the type in question exercise in a given 
world. We can therefore conceive a swap of the roles that properties play in two possible 
worlds, such as the property F playing the charge role and the property G playing the mass 
role in world w1, and F playing the mass role and G playing the charge role in w2. The worlds 
w1 and w2 are indiscernible. Nonetheless, the friend of categorical properties is committed to 
recognizing w1 and w2 as two qualitatively different worlds. To put it in a nutshell, there is a 
qualitative difference between these two worlds that does not make any difference. Thus 
inflating the commitment to worlds is uncomfortable for any metaphysical position, and 
notably for a position that sees itself as being close to empiricism, as does Humean 
metaphysics. 
The causal theory of properties avoids any association with quidditism by tying the essence 
of a property to its causal and thereby to its nomological role: instead of the essence of a 
property being a primitive suchness, the essence of a property is the power to enter into 
certain causal relations. Consequently, what the properties are manifests itself in the causal 
relations in which they figure (more precisely, the causal relations in which events stand in 
virtue of the properties that they instantiate). It is thus not possible to separate the properties 
from the causal relations (see notably Shoemaker 1980, Hawthorne 2001, Bird 2007, 
Chakravartty 2007, chapter 3 to 5). The laws of nature supervene on the properties in 
revealing what properties can do in being certain powers (see e.g. Dorato 2005, chapter 4). 
Consequently, worlds that are indiscernible as regards the causal and nomological relations 
are one and the same world. Although being committed to objective modality by tying the 
essence of a property to a certain causal – and thereby a certain nomological – role, the causal 
view of properties thus is ontologically parsimonious. 
3. Structures and causal properties in fundamental physics 
There is a so-called argument from science for the causal view of properties, drawing on the 
claim that the descriptions scientists give of the properties they acknowledge, including 
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notably the properties they take to be fundamental, are causal descriptions, revealing what 
these properties can do in interactions. However, that argument is not cogent for two reasons. 
In the first place, without adding further premises, there is no valid inference from 
dispositional descriptions to an ontology of dispositional properties (that is, properties whose 
essence is a certain power or disposition). Such further premises are available; but they finally 
rely on the fact that the alternative view of properties, the categorical one, has to subscribe to 
metaphysical commitments such as the one to quiddities that do not serve any purpose for 
science, having notably no explanatory role, whereas the causal view of properties avoids any 
such free-floating commitments by identifying the essence of properties with their causal role 
(see Williams 2011). In brief, due to the additional premises needed, the so-called argument 
from science does not make the case for the causal view of properties stronger than it is 
already as based on the mentioned metaphysical argument only. 
Furthermore – and more importantly as far as the relationship between science and the 
causal view of properties is concerned –, the claim according to which the descriptions 
scientists give of the properties they acknowledge are causal descriptions is in dispute. One 
can maintain that at least as far as fundamental physics is concerned, the basic descriptions 
are structural rather than dispositional ones, drawing on certain symmetries rather than certain 
causal powers. More precisely and more generally speaking, one can associate these two 
types of descriptions with two different forms of or approaches to scientific realism. Entity 
realism, laying stress on experiments rather than theories, seeks for causal explanations of 
experimental results and commits itself to theoretical entities – such as e.g. electrons, or 
elementary particles in general – only insofar as these have the power, disposition or capacity 
to produce phenomena such as the ones observed in the experiments in question. Structural 
realism, by contrast, starts from the structure of scientific theories and maintains in its 
epistemic form (epistemic structural realism – Worrall 1989) that there is a continuity of the 
structure of physical theories in the history of science; in its ontic form, going back to 
Ladyman (1998), structural realism maintains that structure is all there is in nature. 
To strengthen the case for the causal view of properties, we should therefore, for the sake 
of the argument, base ourselves not on experiments and entity realism, but on theories and 
ontic structural realism (OSR). The first point that we can make in this context is to 
emphasize that nearly all the proponents of OSR conceive the structures to which they are 
committed in a non-Humean manner, namely as modal structures (see French and Ladyman 
2003, Ladyman and Ross 2007, chapters 2 to 4, French 2010, section 3; but see Sparber 2009 
and Lyre 2010 and 2011 for Humean versions of OSR). There is a clear reason for this 
commitment: it does not seem to make sense to conceive structures that are pure qualities. 
The identity of a structure obviously is constituted by its playing a certain nomological role. 
This is particularly evident when considering structures that are defined by certain symmetries 
(see notably the “group structural realism” advocated by Roberts 2011). Thus, it obviously 
does not make sense to conceive one and the same structure playing in one world, say, the 
role of the quantum structures of entanglement and in another world the role of the metrical-
gravitational structures – as it does make sense in Humean metaphysics to conceive one and 
the same qualitative, intrinsic property to play the charge role in one world and the mass role 
in another world. The decisive question in this context therefore is this one: Is the 
nomological role that a structure plays also a causal role? Or is it a plausible move when it 
comes to structures to go for a separation between the nomological and the causal role – so 
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that a structure necessarily plays a nomological role, the nomological role constituting its 
identity, but only contingently a causal role? 
OSR is a realism with respect to the structure of a scientific theory (maintaining that there 
is a continuity in the structure of the mature scientific theories in the history of science, 
structure thus being immune to what is known as the argument from pessimistic induction). 
But this stance does not commit the ontic structural realist to Platonism about mathematical 
entities such as the mathematical structure of a fundamental physical theory. What the realist 
claims is that the mathematical structure of a fundamental physical theory refers to or 
represents something that there is in the world independently of our theories. In brief, the 
mathematical structure is a means of representation, and the point of OSR is the claim that 
what there is in the world, what the mathematical structure represents or refers to, is itself a 
structure, namely a physical structure. 
To mention but one example, when one endorses a realist stance in the interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, one does not advocate Platonism with respect to mathematical entities 
such as the wavefunction (state vector) in a mathematical space; one maintains that these 
mathematical entities represent something that there is in the world by contrast to being mere 
tools in calculating probabilities for measurement outcomes (see e.g. Maudlin 2010 for a clear 
statement in that sense in contrast to claims to the contrary, such as Albert 1996). The realist 
in the interpretation of quantum mechanics therefore has the task to spell out what it is in the 
world that the quantum formalism refers to. Accordingly, the ontic structural realist has the 
charge to explain what a physical structure is in distinction to a mathematical structure that is 
employed as a means to represent what there is in the physical world, thereby replying to the 
widespread objection that OSR blurs the distinction between the mathematical and the 
physical (see e.g. Cao 2003 for that objection). Simply refusing to answer that question (as do 
Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 158) is not acceptable. 
In the context of a traditional metaphysics of universals and intrinsic properties, one can 
maintain that there are property types as universals, and that there are objects in the world that 
instantiate these property types. However, even if one is not an eliminativist about objects as 
is French (2010), but defends a moderate version of OSR that admits objects as that what 
stands in the relations in which the structures consist (Esfeld 2004, Esfeld and Lam 2008), 
such a move is not available to the ontic structural realist in order to answer the question what 
distinguishes physical from mathematical structures: it presupposes the existence of objects as 
something that is primitively there to instantiate the mathematical structures, being 
ontologically distinct from the structures. But insofar as OSR is in the position to admit 
objects, it can recognize only what French (2010) calls thin objects. More precisely, it can 
acknowledge objects only as that what stands in the relations that constitute the structures, the 
relations being the ways in which the objects are so that the objects do not have any existence 
or identity independently of the relations (Esfeld and Lam 2011). 
Nonetheless, in order to answer the question how to distinguish physical from mathematical 
entities, the ontic structural realist can draw on another position that is widespread in 
traditional metaphysics, namely the causal criterion of existence, also known as Alexander’s 
dictum: real physical structures distinguish themselves from their representations in terms of 
mathematical structures by being causally efficacious (Esfeld 2009). Concrete physical 
structures are first-order properties, too, namely first-order relations. They can be conceived 
as causal properties in the same manner as intrinsic properties: in being certain qualitative 
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physical structures, they are the power to bring about certain effects. Structures can be 
causally efficacious in the same sense as intrinsic properties of events: as events can bring 
about effects in virtue of having certain intrinsic properties, they can bring about effects in 
virtue of standing in certain relations with each other so that it is the network of relations – 
that is, the structure as a whole – that is causally efficacious (see Esfeld and Sachse 2011, 
chapter 2, for details of such a metaphysics of causal structures). Furthermore, one thus 
accounts for the dynamics of physical systems: OSR is a proposal for an ontology of physical 
systems, but as such it is silent on their dynamical evolution. 
This is not to say that the conception of causal structures is the only game in town to 
answer the question what distinguishes real physical structures from their representation in 
terms of mathematical structures, to spell out the modal nature of structures in OSR and to 
account for the dynamics of physical systems on the basis of OSR (see Psillos 2011 for a 
criticism of this position). The reflection on these issues in the framework of OSR has just 
begun. But an answer to these questions is needed so that one can then engage in the business 
of assessing the options. 
4. Causal realism at work in the interpretation of fundamental physics 
The arguments in the two preceding sections are rather abstract and general. In order to make 
a case for causal realism, one has to show in concrete terms how this interpretation applies to 
the current fundamental physical theories and what benefits one gets from doing so. A 
commitment to dispositions in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is usually linked with 
versions of quantum mechanics that recognize state reductions, leading from entanglement to 
something that comes at least close to classical physical properties (see Suárez 2007). The 
theory of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986) (GRW) is the most elaborate physical proposal 
in that respect. Indeed, in the GRW framework, one can maintain that the structures of 
quantum entanglement are the disposition or the power to bring about classical properties 
through state reductions in the form of spontaneous localizations. Doing so answers a number 
of crucial questions in the interpretation of quantum mechanics: (a) it tells us what the 
properties of quantum systems are if there are no properties with definite numerical values, 
namely dispositions to bring about such properties, and these dispositions are real and actual 
properties (by contrast to mere potentialities); (b) it provides for a solution to the so-called 
measurement problem, without smuggling the notions of measurement interactions, 
measurement devices, or observers into the interpretation of a fundamental physical theory; 
(c) it yields the probabilities that we need to account for the quantum probabilities, namely 
objective, single case probabilities, by conceiving the dispositions for state reductions in the 
form of spontaneous localizations as propensities; (d) it provides for an account of the 
direction of time: processes of state reductions are irreversible, thus singling out a direction of 
time; if these processes go back to entangled states as dispositions for state reductions, their 
irreversibility is explained by the relationship of dispositions and their manifestations being 
irreversible (see Dorato and Esfeld 2010 for spelling out these points in detail, and see Dorato 
2007 for dispositions in the interpretation of quantum mechanics in general). 
Nonetheless, causal realism in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is not tied to 
realism with respect to state reductions. Regarding the quantum structures of entanglement as 
dispositions or powers also has certain benefits in the framework of the version of quantum 
mechanics that goes back to Everett (1957), recognizing no state reductions and taking the 
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dynamics given by the Schrödinger equation to be the complete dynamics of quantum 
systems (and, by way of consequence, all physical systems). The claim then is that the 
structures of quantum entanglement are the disposition or the power to bring about a splitting 
of the universe into infinitely many branches through decoherence, the branches existing in 
parallel without interfering with each other; each of them appears like a domain of classical 
properties to an internal observer. 
Notably the above mentioned points (a) and (d) apply also in this framework: decoherence 
and the splitting of the world into infinitely many branches is a fundamental, irreversible 
process, whereas the Schrödinger dynamics is time-reversal invariant. Conceiving entangled 
states as dispositions that manifest themselves spontaneously through decoherence and the 
splitting of the universe into infinitely many branches grounds that principled irreversibility. 
Furthermore, one has to provide an answer to the question of what entangled states are prior 
to the splitting of the universe into infinitely many branches. Simply drawing on the quantum 
formalism and proposing a realist attitude towards the wavefunction or state vector in 
configuration space does not answer that question, as pointed out in the preceding section. 
Conceiving entangled states as dispositions in the mentioned sense, by contrast, answers that 
question in setting out a clear ontology of what entangled states are objectively in the world, 
grounding the subsequent appearance of classical properties (see Dorato and Esfeld in 
preparation for details). 
Again, conceiving entangled states as dispositions or powers may not be the only game in 
town. But work in the philosophy of physics has to be done in order to answer the mentioned 
ontological questions, instead of hiding oneself behind a mathematical formalism and passing 
what is de facto a realism with respect to mathematical entities for a realism with respect to 
the physical world. 
Dispositions in the sense of causal powers also figure prominently in the ontology of 
Bohmian mechanics, the third serious option in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The 
quantum potential of Bohmian mechanics obviously is a physical structure whose essence 
consists not only in exercising a certain nomological role, but that nomological role also is a 
causal role: it is essential for the quantum potential to guide or pilot the movement of the 
quantum particles. However, in contrast to GRW and Everettian quantum mechanics, where 
entangled states and their development in time to classical properties or the appearance of 
classical properties is all there is, Bohmian mechanics cannot be construed as falling within 
dispositional monism or dispositional essentialism: over and above the quantum potential, 
there are the quantum particles, whose essential quantum property is their position, the hidden 
variable. The quantum potential acts on the quantum particles in determining their trajectory, 
but the quantum particles are causally inert: they do not in turn act on the quantum potential. 
But this fact constitutes a serious objection to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics. One can 
with good reason follow Bell (1987, in particular chapter 7) in acknowledging the need for 
local beables. It is, however, questionable whether one respects the spirit of Bell’s demand in 
posing local beables that are hidden variables and that are causally inert, not manifesting 
themselves in any way. 
Turning briefly to the other fundamental physical theory, general relativity, it seems at first 
glance that this theory suits well causal realism, since it abandons the view of space-time as a 
passive background structure, regarding instead the metrical field as a dynamical entity that 
accounts for the gravitational effects. It seems therefore that one can conceive the metrical 
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properties of space-time points as dispositions or causal powers to bring about the 
gravitational effects (see Bird 2009 and Bartels 1996, pp. 37-38, and 2011 – Bartels, however, 
voices also reservations about dispositional essentialism in this context). But the case is not so 
clear: the gravitational effects are due to the movement of bodies along geodesics. One can 
therefore also argue that what seems to be gravitational effects are not effects that need a 
causal explanation, but is simply due to the geometry of curved space-time, not requiring a 
causal explanation in the same way as the inertial motion of a particle in Newtonian 
mechanics does not call for a causal explanation (see Livanios 2008, in particular pp. 389-
390). The case for causal realism in the philosophy of general relativity hangs on the ontology 
of the metrical field that one adopts, in other words, the stance that one takes in the traditional 
debate between substantivalism and relationalism cast in the framework of general relativity. 
Ultimately, the issue has to be settled in an ontology of quantum gravity. 
In sum, causal realism can do a good ontological work in the framework of standard 
quantum mechanics with or without state reductions, less so in Bohmian mechanics, and the 
case of general relativity theory depends on further parameters, such as the ontological stance 
that one adopts towards space-time (substantivalism or relationalism). 
5. Causal realism from fundamental physics to the special sciences 
Assume that there are structures of quantum entanglement at the ontological ground floor that 
develop into classical properties that are correlated with each other in certain ways, or into the 
appearance of classical properties through the splitting of the universe into many branches. 
Assume furthermore that some of these classical properties build up local physical structures 
that distinguish themselves from their environment in bringing about certain effects as a 
whole – such as, for instance, a DNA sequence that produces a certain protein, or a brain that 
produces a certain behaviour of an organism. In conceiving the entangled states and, 
accordingly, such local physical structures as causal powers, causal realism provides for a 
unified ontology for fundamental physics as well as biology and the special sciences in 
general (see Esfeld and Sachse 2011 for details). 
On a Humean metaphysics of categorical properties, properties that are pure qualities and 
configurations of such properties can have a certain function in a given world and thus make 
true descriptions in dispositional, or functional terms; but there can be no functional 
properties, that is properties for which it is essential to exercise a certain causal role. 
However, on a widespread account of functions, namely the causal-dispositional one, the 
properties to which biology and the special sciences are committed are functional properties, 
consisting in exercising a certain causal role (Cummins 1975). Notably the entire discussion 
of functionalism as the mainstream position in the philosophy of psychology and the social 
sciences is couched in terms of functional properties. 
The advantage of causal realism is to be in the position to take the talk of functional 
properties literally: there really are functional properties in which biology and the special 
sciences in general trade out there in the world, for all the properties that there are in the 
world, down to the fundamental physical ones, are causal properties, being the disposition or 
the power to produce certain effects in being certain qualities. The commitment to causal 
properties in physics allows us to be realist about causal properties in the special sciences, and 
that commitment is a necessary condition for the latter realism: if there were no causal 
properties in physics, there would be no causal properties in the special sciences either (unless 
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one were to maintain a dualism of free-floating properties of the special sciences). Taking for 
granted that the properties with which the special sciences deal supervene on the fundamental 
physical properties, if there is to be causation in the production sense in the domain of the 
special sciences, properties bringing about certain effects in virtue of their causal nature, there 
is causation in that sense in the fundamental physical domain, the supervenience base, as well. 
In other words, under the assumption of supervenience, if there is objective modality in the 
domain of the special sciences, there is objective modality also in the domain of fundamental 
physics. 
Again, causal realism may not be the only game in town for a coherent ontology reaching 
from physics to biology and the special sciences in general. But, again, the task is to spell out 
such an ontology, and causal realism is one way to achieve that task. As any metaphysical 
position, causal realism has to be assessed on the basis of overall considerations, taking into 
account the metaphysics of properties, the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of the 
special sciences. 
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